This paper presents efficient structure-preserving signature schemes based on simple assumptions such as Decisional-Linear. We first give two general frameworks for constructing fully secure signature schemes from weaker building blocks such as variations of one-time signatures and random-message secure signatures. They can be seen as refinements of the Even-Goldreich-Micali framework, and preserve many desirable properties of the underlying schemes such as constant signature size and structure preservation. We then instantiate them based on simple (i.e., not q-type) assumptions over symmetric and asymmetric bilinear groups. The resulting schemes are structure-preserving and yield constant-size signatures consisting of 11 to 14 group elements, which compares favorably to existing schemes whose security relies on q-type assumptions.
Introduction
A structure-preserving signature (SPS) scheme [4] is a digital signature scheme with two structural properties: (i) the verification keys, messages, and signatures are all elements of a bilinear group; and (ii) the verification algorithm checks a conjunction of pairing product equations over the key, the message and the signature. This makes them compatible with the efficient non-interactive proof system for pairing-product equations by Groth and Sahai (GS) [37] . Structure-preserving cryptographic primitives promise to combine the advantages of optimized number theoretic non-blackbox constructions with the modularity and insight of protocols that use only generic cryptographic building blocks.
Indeed the instantiation of known generic constructions with an SPS scheme and the GS proof system has led to many new and more efficient schemes: Groth [36] showed how to construct an efficient simulation-sound zero-knowledge proof system (ss-NIZK) building on generic constructions of [24, 47, 42] . Abe et al. [4, 8] show how to obtain efficient round-optimal blind signatures by instantiating a framework by Fischlin [27] . SPS are also important building blocks for a wide range of cryptographic functionalities such as anonymous proxy signatures [29] , delegatable anonymous credentials [10] , transferable e-cash [30] and compact verifiable shuffles [21] . Most recently, [38] show how to construct a structure preserving treebased signature scheme with a tight security reduction following the approach of [33, 25] . This signature scheme is then used to build a ss-NIZK which in turn is used with the Naor-Yung-Sahai [43, 46] paradigm to build the first CCA secure public-key encryption scheme with a tight security reduction. Examples for other schemes that benefit from efficient SPS are [11, 15, 12, 40, 34, 9, 45, 31, 28, 35] .
Because properties (i) and (ii) are the only dependencies on the SPS scheme made by these constructions, any structure-preserving signature scheme can be used as a drop-in replacement. Unfortunately, all known efficient instantiations of SPS [8, 4, 5] are based on so-called q-type or interactive assumptions. An open question since Groth's seminal work [36] (only partially answered by [20] ) is to construct a SPS scheme that is both efficient -in particular constant-size in the number of signed group elements -and that is based on assumptions that are as weak as those required by the GS proof system itself.
Our contribution
We begin by presenting two new generic constructions of signature schemes that are secure against chosen message attacks (CMA) from variations of one-time signatures and signatures secure against random message attacks (RMA). Both constructions inherit the structure-preserving and constant-size properties from the underlying components. We then instantiate the building blocks with the desired properties over bilinear groups. They yield constant-size structure-preserving signature schemes whose signatures consist of only 11 to 14 group elements and whose security can be proven based on simple assumptions such as Decisional-Linear (DLIN) for symmetric bilinear groups and analogues of DDH and DLIN for asymmetric bilinear groups. These are the first constant-size structure-preserving signature schemes that eliminate the use of interactive or q-type assumptions while achieving reasonable efficiency. We give more details on our generic constructions and their instantiations:
• The first generic construction (SIG1, Section 4.1) combines a new variation of one-time signatures which we call tagged one-time signatures (TOS) and signatures secure against random message attacks (RMA). A TOS is a signature scheme that attaches a fresh tag to each signature. It is unforgeable with respect to tags used only once. In our construction, a message is signed with our TOS using a fresh random tag, and then the tag is signed with the second signature scheme, denoted by rSIG.
Since rSIG only signs random tags, RMA-security is sufficient. In Section 5, we construct structure-preserving TOS and rSIG based on DLIN over symmetric (Type-I) bilinear groups. Our TOS yields constant-size signatures and optimally small tags that consists of only one group element. The resulting structure-preserving signature scheme produces signatures consisting of 14 group elements, and relies solely on the DLIN assumption. 1 • The second generic construction (SIG2, Section 4.2) combines partial one-time signatures and signatures secure against extended random message attacks (XRMA). The latter is a new notion that we explain below. A partial one-time signature scheme, denoted by POS, is a one-time signature scheme in which only a part of the key is renewed for every signing operation. The notion was first introduced by Bellare and Shoup [13] under the name of two-tier signatures. In our construction, a message is signed with POS and then the one-time portion of the public-key is certified by the second signature scheme, denoted by xSIG. The difference between a TOS and POS is that a one-time public-key is associated with a one-time secret-key. Since the one-time secret-key is needed for signing, it must be known to the reduction in the security proof. XRMA-security guarantees that xSIG is unforgeable even if the adversary is given auxiliary information associated with the randomly chosen messages (e.g. the random coins used for selecting the message). The auxiliary information allows the reduction algorithm to security of the second scheme to use the one-time secret key to generate the POS component correctly. In Section 6, we construct structure-preserving POS and xSIG signature schemes based on assumptions that are analogues of DDH and DLIN in Type-III bilinear groups. The resulting SIG2 is structure-preserving and produces signatures consisting of 11 or 14 group elements depending on whether messages belong to either or both source groups.
The role of TOS and POS is to compress a message into a constant number of random group elements. This observation is interesting in light of [6] that implies the impossibility of constructing collision resistant and shrinking structure-preserving hash functions, which could immediately yield constant-size signatures. Our (extended) RMA-secure signature schemes are structure-preserving variants of Waters' dual-signature scheme [51] . In general, the difficulty of constructing CMA-secure SPS arises from the fact that the exponents of the group elements chosen by the adversary as a message are not known to the reduction in the security proof. On the other hand, for RMA security, it is the challenger that chooses the message and therefore the exponents can be known in reductions. This is the crucial advantage for constructing (extended) RMA-secure structure-preserving signature schemes based on Waters' dual-signature scheme.
As our SPSs can be drop-in replacements for existing SPS, we only briefly introduce recent applications in Section 7. They include group signatures, tightly-secure structure-preserving signatures and public-key encryption, and efficient adaptive oblivious transfer.
Related Works
On Generic Constructions: Even, Goldreich and Micali [26] proposed a generic framework (the EGM framework) that combines a one-time signature scheme and a signature scheme that is secure against nonadaptive chosen message attacks (NACMA) to construct a signature scheme that is secure against adaptive chosen message attacks (CMA).
In fact, our generic constructions can be seen as refinements of the EGM framework. There are two reasons why the original framework falls short for our purpose. The first is that relaxing to NACMA does not seem to help much in constructing efficient structure-preserving signatures since the messages are still under the control of the adversary and the exponents of the messages are not known to the reduction algorithm in the security proof. As mentioned above, resorting to (extended) RMA is a great help in this regard. In [26] , they also showed that CMA-secure signatures exist iff RMA-secure signatures exist. The proof, however, does not follow their framework and their impractical construction is mainly a feasibility result. In fact, we argue that RMA-security alone is not sufficient for the original EGM framework. As mentioned above, the necessity of XRMA security arises in the reduction that uses RMA-security to argue security of the ordinary signature scheme, as the reduction not only needs to know the random one-time public-keys, but also their corresponding one-time secret keys in order to generate the one-time signature components of the signatures. The auxiliary information in the XRMA definition facilitates access to these secret keys. Similarly, tagged one-time signatures avoid this problem as tags do not have associated secret values. The second reason that the EGM approach is not quite suited to our task is that the EGM framework produces signatures that are linear in the size of one-time public-keys of the one-time signature scheme, and known structure-preserving one-time signature schemes have one-time public-keys that scale linearly with the number of group elements to be signed. Here, tagged or partial one-time signature schemes come in handy as they have one-time public-keys separated from long-term public-keys. Thus, to obtain constantsize signatures, we only require the one-time keys to be constant-size while allowing the long-term part to scale in the size of the message.
On Efficient Instantiations: All previous constructions of structure-preserving signature schemes are either inefficient, or use strong assumptions, or do not yield constant-size signatures. In particular, there are few schemes that base on simple assumptions. Hofheinz and Jager [38] constructed an SPS scheme by following the EGM framework. The resulting scheme allows a tight security reduction to DLIN but the size of signatures depends logarithmically on the number of signing operations as their NACMA-secure scheme is tree-based (like the Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest signature scheme [33] ). Chase and Kohlweiss [20] and Camenisch, Dubovitskaya, and Haralambiev [18] constructed SPS schemes with security based on DLIN that improve the performance of Groth's scheme [36] by several orders of magnitude. The size of the resulting signatures, however, is still linear in the number of signed group elements, and an order of magnitude larger than in our constructions. Finally, Camenisch, Dubovitskaya, and Haralambiev constructed a constant-size SPS scheme based on simple assumptions over composite-order groups [17] .
Preliminaries

Notation
By X := Y , we denote that object Y is referred to as X. For set X, notation a ← X denotes a uniform sampling from X. Multiple independent samples from the same set X are denoted by a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . . ← X. By Y ← A(X), we denote the process where algorithm A is executed with X as input and its output is labeled as Y . When A is an oracle algorithm that interacts with oracle O, it is denoted as Y ← A O (X). By Pr[X | A 1 , A 2 , ..., A k ] we denote the probability that event X happens after executing the sequence of algorithms A 1 , . . . , A k . The probability is taken over all coin flips observed in A 1 , . . . , A k unless otherwise noted. We say that a function is negligible in security parameter λ if < λ −c holds for all constant c > 0 and all sufficiently large λ. We refer to probabilistic polynomial time algorithms as p.p.t. algorithms. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that all algorithms are potentially probabilistic.
Bilinear groups
Let G be a bilinear group generator that takes security parameter 1 λ and outputs a description of bilinear groups Λ := (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e), where G 1 , G 2 and G T are groups of prime order p, and e is an efficient and non-degenerate bilinear map G 1 × G 2 → G T . In this paper, generators for G 1 and G 2 are implicit in Λ, and default random generators G andĜ are chosen explicitly and independently. Groups G 1 and G 2 are called the source groups and G T is called the target group. We use multiplicative notation for G 1 , G 2 and G T . By G * 1 , we denote G 1 \ {1}, which is the set of all elements in G 1 except the identity. The same applies to G 2 and G T as well. Following the terminology in [32] we say that Λ is Type-III when there is no efficient mapping between G 1 and G 2 in either direction.
In the Type-III setting, we denote elements in G 2 by putting a tilde on a variable likeX for visual aid. By using the same letter for elements in G 2 and G 1 with a hat on the G 2 element, e.g., X andX, we denote a pair of elements in relation log G X = logĜX. Should their relation be explicitly stated, we write X ∼X. Note that default random generators G andĜ are independent each other but notational consistency retains.
We count the number of group elements to measure the size of cryptographic objects such as keys, messages, and signatures. For Type-III groups, we denote the size by (x, y) when it consists of x and y elements from G 1 and G 2 , respectively. We refer to the setting as Type-I when G 1 = G 2 (i.e., there are efficient mappings in both directions). This is also called the symmetric setting. In this case, we define Λ := (p, G, G T , e). When we need to be specific, the group description yielded by G will be written as Λ asym or Λ sym .
Assumptions
Let G be a generator of bilinear groups. All hardness assumptions we deal with are defined relative to G. We first define the computational and decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions (CDH 1 , DDH 1 ) and decisional linear assumption (DLIN 1 ) for Type-III bilinear groups. The corresponding more standard assumptions, CDH, DDH, and DLIN, in Type-I groups are obtained by setting G 1 = G 2 and G =Ĝ in the respective definitions.
Definition 1 (Computation co-Diffie-Hellman Assumption: CDH 1 ).
where Z 1 = G xy and Z 0 = G z for random x, y, z ← Z p and random bit b, any p.p.t. algorithm A decides whether b = 1 or 0 with negligible advantage Adv ddh1 G,A (λ) in λ.
Definition 3 (Decisional Linear Assumption in
and Z 0 = G z 3 for random x, y, z ← Z p and random bit b, any p.p.t. algorithm A decides whether b = 1 or 0 with negligible advantage Adv dlin1 G,A (λ) in λ.
For DDH 1 and DLIN 1 , we define an analogous assumption in G 2 (DDH 2 ) by swapping G 1 and G 2 in the respective definitions. In Type-III bilinear groups, it is assumed that both DDH 1 and DDH 2 hold simultaneously. The assumption is called the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption (SXDH), and we define advantage Adv sxdh G,C by Adv sxdh G,C (λ) := Adv ddh1 G,A (λ) + Adv ddh2 G,B (λ). We extend DLIN in a similar manner:
The XDLIN 1 assumption is equivalent to the DLIN 1 assumption in the generic bilinear group model [50, 14] where one can simulate the extra elements,
in DLIN 1 . We define the XDLIN 2 assumption analogously by givingĜ x+y 3 orĜ z 3 as Z b , to A instead. Then we define the simultaneous external DLIN assumption, SXDLIN, that assumes that both XDLIN 1 and XDLIN 2 hold at the same time. By Adv xdlin2 G,A (Adv sxdlin G,A , resp.), we denote the advantage function for XDLIN 2 (and SXDLIN, resp.).
Definition 5 (Double Pairing Assumption in
The double pairing assumption in G 2 (DBP 2 ) is defined in the same manner by swapping G 1 and G 2 . It is known that DBP 1 (DBP 2 , resp.) is implied by DDH 1 (DDH 2 , resp.) and the reduction is tight [8] . Note that the double pairing assumption does not hold in Type-I groups since Z = G r , R = G −1 z is a trivial solution. Thus in Type-I groups we will instead use the following extension:
Definition 6 (Simultaneous Double Pairing Assumption [19] : SDP).
As shown in [19] , for the Type-I setting the simultaneous double pairing assumption holds relative to G if the decisional linear assumption holds for G.
Definitions
Common setup
All building blocks make use of a common setup algorithm Setup that takes the security parameter 1 λ and outputs a global parameter gk that is given to all other algorithms. Usually gk consists of a description Λ of a bilinear group setup and a default generator for each group. In this paper, we include several additional generators in gk for technical reasons. Note that when the resulting signature scheme is used in multi-user applications different additional generators need to be assigned to individual users or one needs to fall back on the common reference string model, whereas Λ and the default generators can be shared. Thus we count the size of gk when we assess the efficiency of concrete instantiations. For ease of notation, we make gk implicit except w.r.t. key generation algorithms.
Signature schemes
We use the following syntax for signature schemes suitable for the multi-user and multi-algorithm setting. We follow standard syntax with the following modifications: the key generation function takes as input global parameter gk generated by Setup (instead of security parameter 1 λ ), and the message space M is determined solely by gk (instead of being determined by the public-key).
Definition 7 (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme SIG is a triple of polynomial-time algorithms (Key, Sign, Vrf):
• SIG.Key(gk) generates a public-key vk and a secret-key sk.
• SIG.Sign(sk, msg) takes sk and message msg and outputs a signature σ.
• SIG.Vrf(vk, msg, σ) outputs 1 for acceptance or 0 for rejection.
Correctness requires that 1 = SIG.Vrf(vk, msg, σ) holds for any gk generated by Setup, any keys generated as (vk, sk) ← SIG.Key(gk), any message msg ∈ M, and any signature σ ← SIG.Sign(sk, msg).
Definition 8 (Unforgeability against Adaptive Chosen-Message Attacks).
A signature scheme is unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks (UF-CMA) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time oracle algorithms A the following advantage function Adv uf-cma SIG,A is bound by a negligible function in λ.
O s is a signing oracle that, on receiving message msg j , performs σ j ← SIG.Sign(sk, msg j ), returns σ j to A, and records msg j to Q m , which is an initially empty list.
Definition 9 (Unforgeability against Non-Adaptive Chosen-Message Attacks). A signature scheme is unforgeable against non-adaptive chosen message attacks (UF-NACMA) if for any probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms A and any polynomial n in λ, the following advantage function Adv uf-nacma SIG,A (λ) is bound by a negligible function in λ.
It is implicit that A in the first run hands over an internal state to that in the second run.
Definition 10 (Unforgeability against Random Message Attacks (UF-RMA) [26] ). A signature scheme is unforgeable against random message attacks (UF-RMA) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A and any positive integer n bound by a polynomial in λ, the following advantage function Adv uf-rma SIG,A is negligible in λ.
We consider a variation of random message attacks where the adversary is given, for example, the random coin used to sample the random message. Our formal definition covers more general idea of auxiliary information about the message generator as follows. Let MSGGen be a message generation algorithm that takes gk (and random coins as well) as input and outputs msg ∈ M. Furthermore, MSGGen outputs auxiliary information ω, which may give some hint about the random coins used for selecting msg. The extended random message attack is defined relative to message generator MSGGen as follows.
The above syntax and security notions can be applied to one-time signature schemes by restricting the oracle access only once or parameter n to 1.
Definition 11 (Unforgeability against Extended Random Message Attacks (UF-XRMA)). A signature scheme is unforgeable against extended random message attacks (UF-XRMA) with respect to message sampler MSGGen if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A and any positive integer n bound by a polynomial in λ, the following advantage function Adv uf-xrma SIG,A is bound by a negligible function in λ.
For the above security notions,UF-CMA ⇒ UF-XRMA ⇒ UF-RMA holds. More precisely, for any signature scheme SIG, for any A there exists A such that Adv uf-cma SIG,A (λ) ≥ Adv uf-xrma SIG,A (λ), and for any A there exists A such that Adv uf-xrma SIG,A (λ) ≥ Adv uf-rma SIG,A (λ).
Partial one-time and tagged one-time signatures
Partial one-time signatures, also known as two-tier signatures [13] , are a variation of one-time signatures where only part of the public-key and secret-key must be updated for every signing, while the remaining part can be persistent.
Definition 12 (Partial One-Time Signature Scheme [13] ). A partial one-time signatures scheme POS is a set of polynomial-time algorithms POS.{Key, Update, Sign, Vrf}.
• POS.Key(gk) generates a long-term public-key pk and secret-key sk , and sets the associated message space to be M o as defined by gk. (Recall that we require that M o be completely defined by gk.)
• POS.Update(gk) takes gk as input, and outputs a one-time key pair (opk , osk ). We denote the space for opk by K opk .
• POS.Sign(sk , msg, osk ) outputs a signature σ on message msg based on sk and osk .
• POS.Vrf(pk , opk , msg, σ) outputs 1 for acceptance, or 0 for rejection.
Correctness requires that 1 = POS.Vrf(pk , opk , msg, σ) holds except for negligible probability for any gk, pk , opk , σ, and msg ∈ M o , such that gk ← Setup(1 λ ), (pk , sk ) ← POS.Key(gk), (opk , osk ) ← POS.Update(gk), σ ← POS.Sign(sk , msg, osk ).
A tagged one-time signature scheme is a signature scheme whose signing function in addition to the long-term secret key takes a tag as input. A tag is one-time, i.e., it must be different for every signing. • TOS.Key(gk) generates a long-term public-key pk and secret-key sk , and sets the associated message space to be M t as defined by gk.
• TOS.Tag(gk) takes gk as input and outputs tag. By T , we denote the space for tag.
• TOS.Sign(sk , msg, tag) outputs signature σ for message msg based on sk and tag.
• TOS.Vrf(pk , tag, msg, σ) outputs 1 for acceptance, or 0 for rejection.
Correctness requires that 1 = TOS.Vrf(pk , tag, msg, σ) holds except for negligible probability for any gk, pk , tag, σ, and msg ∈ M t , such that gk ← Setup(1 λ ), (pk , sk ) ← TOS.Key(gk), tag ← TOS.Tag(gk), σ ← TOS.Sign(sk , msg, tag).
A TOS scheme is a POS scheme for which tag = osk = opk . We can thus give a security notion for POS schemes that also applies to TOS schemes by reading Update = Tag and tag = osk = opk .
Definition 14 (Unforgeability against One-Time Adaptive Chosen-Message Attacks). A partial one-time signature scheme is unforgeable against one-time adaptive chosen message attacks (OT-CMA) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time oracle algorithms A the following advantage function Adv ot-cma POS,A is negligible in λ.
O t is the one-time key generation oracle that on receiving a request invokes a fresh session j, performs (opk j , osk j ) ← POS.Update(gk), and returns opk j . O s is the signing oracle that, on receiving a message msg j for session j, performs σ j ← POS.Sign(sk , msg j , osk j ), returns σ j to A, and records (opk j , msg j , σ j ) to the list Q m . O s works only once for each session. Strong unforgeability is defined by replacing condition msg † = msg with (msg † , σ † ) = (msg, σ).
We define a non-adaptive variant (OT-NACMA) of the above notion by integrating O t into O s so that opk j and σ j are returned to A at the same time. Namely, A must submit msg j before seeing opk j . If a scheme is secure in the sense of OT-CMA, the scheme is also secure in the sense of OT-NACMA. By Adv ot-nacma POS,A (λ) we denote the advantage of A in this non-adaptive case. For TOS, we use the same notation, OT-CMA and OT-NACMA, and define advantage functions Adv ot-cma TOS,A and Adv ot-nacma TOS,A accordingly. We will also consider strong unforgeability, for which we use labels sot-cma and sot-nacma. Recall that if a scheme is strongly unforgeable, it is unforgeable as well.
We define a condition that is relevant for coupling random message secure signature schemes with partial one-time and tagged one-time signature schemes in later sections.
Definition 15 (Tag/One-time Public-Key Uniformity). A TOS is called uniform-tag if TOS.Tag outputs tag that uniformly distributes over tag space T . Similarly, a POS is called uniform-key if POS.Update outputs opk that distributes uniformly over key space K opk . Let rSIG be a signature scheme with message space M r , and TOS be a tagged one-time signature scheme with tag space T such that M r = T and both schemes use the same Setup. We construct a signature scheme SIG1 from rSIG and TOS. Let gk be the global parameter generated by Setup(1 λ ). It is assumed that a secret-key of rSIG includes gk.
Structure-preserving signatures
[Generic Construction 1: SIG1] SIG1.Key(gk): Run (pk t , sk t ) ← TOS.Key(gk), (vk r , sk r ) ← rSIG.Key(gk). Output vk := (pk t , vk r ) and sk := (sk t , sk r ).
SIG1.Sign(sk, msg): Parse sk into (sk t , sk r ) and take gk from sk r . Run tag ← TOS.Tag(gk), σ t ← TOS.Sign(sk t , msg, tag), σ r ← rSIG.Sign(sk r , tag). Output σ := (tag, σ t , σ r ).
SIG1.Vrf(vk, msg, σ): Parse vk and σ accordingly. Output 1 if 1 = TOS.Vrf(pk t , tag, msg, σ t ) and 1 = rSIG.Vrf(vk r , tag, σ r ). Output 0 otherwise. ¶
We prove that SIG1 is secure by showing a reduction to the security of each component. As our reductions are efficient in their running time, we only relate success probabilities. Theorem 1. SIG1 is UF-CMA if TOS is uniform-tag and OT-NACMA, and rSIG is UF-RMA. In particular, for any p.p.t. algorithm A there exist p.p.t. algorithms B and C such that
Security against random messages is sufficient for rSIG as it is used only to sign uniformly chosen tags. To formally prove it, however, we use the important fact that the signing function of TOS does not require any secret behind the tags. Departing from the UF-CMA game for SIG1, the security proof is done by evaluating two game transitions. The first transition is bases on the OT-NACMA security of TOS. This part is rather simple as we can construct a simulator in a straightforward manner by following the key generation and signing of rSIG. The second transition is bases on UF-RMA of rSIG. We construct a simulator that, given signatures of rSIG on uniformly chosen tags as messages, simulates signatures of SIG1 for messages provided by the adversary. For this to be done, the simulator needs to compute one-time signatures of TOS for the given uniform tags. This, however, can be done without any problem since the simulator has legitimate signing keys that are sufficient to run the signing function of TOS with uniform tags.
Proof. Any signature that is accepted as a successful forgery must either reuse an existing tag, or sign a new tag. We show that former case reduces to attacking TOS and the latter case reduces to attacking rSIG. Thus the success probability Adv uf-cma SIG1,A (λ) of an attacker on SIG1 will be bounded by the sum of the success probabilities Adv ot-nacma TOS,B (λ) of an attacker on TOS and the success probability Adv uf-rma rSIG,C (λ) of an attacker on rSIG.
Game 0: The actual Unforgeability game. Pr[Game 0] = Adv uf-cma SIG1,A (λ).
Game 1:
The real security game except that the winning condition is changed to no longer accept repetition of tags.
Proof. Attacker A wins in Game 0, but loses in Game 1, iff it produces a forgery that reuses a tag from a signing query. We describe a reduction B that uses such an attacker to break the OT-NACMAsecurity of TOS. The reduction B receives gk and pk t from the challenger of TOS, sets up vk r and sk r honestly by running rSIG.Key(gk), and provides gk and vk = (vk r , pk t ) to A.
To answer a signing query, B uses the signing oracle of TOS to get tag and σ t , signs tag using sk r to produce σ r , and returns (tag, σ t , σ r ). When A produces a forgery
as a forgery for TOS.
Game 2:
The fully idealized game. The winning condition is changed to reject all signatures.
Proof. Attacker A wins in Game 1, iff it produces a forgery with a fresh tag. We describe a reduction algorithm C that uses A to break the UF-RMA security of rSIG. Algorithm C receives gk and vk r , runs (pk t , sk t ) ← TOS.Key(gk), and provides gk and vk = (vk r , pk t ) to A.
To answer signing query on message msg, algorithm C consults O s and receives random message msg r ← T and signature σ r . Algorithm C then uses msg r as a tag, i.e., tag = msg r , and creates signature σ t on msg by running TOS.Sign(sk t , msg, tag). It then returns (tag, σ t , σ r ). Note that for a uniform-tag TOS scheme TOS.Tag(gk) would generate tags distributed uniformly over the tag space T . Thus the reduction simulation is perfect. When A produces a forgery
The following theorem is immediately obtained from the construction.
Theorem 2. If TOS.Tag produces constant-size tags and signatures in the size of input messages, the resulting SIG1 produces constant-size signatures as well. Furthermore, if TOS and rSIG are structurepreserving, so is SIG1.
SIG2: Combining partial one-time and XRMA-secure signatures
Let xSIG be a signature scheme with message space M x , and POS be a partial one-time signature scheme with one-time public-key space K opk such that M x = K opk and both schemes use the same Setup. We construct a signature scheme SIG2 from xSIG and POS. Let gk be a global parameter generated by Setup(1 λ ).
It is assumed that a secret key for xSIG contains gk.
[Generic 
The proof is almost the same as that for Theorem 1. The only difference appears in constructing C in the second step. Since POS.Update is used as the extended random message generator, the pair (msg, ω) is in fact (opk , osk ). Given (opk , osk ), adversary C can run POS.Sign(sk , msg, osk ) to yield legitimate signatures. As for our first generic construction, the following theorem holds from the construction. 
Instantiating SIG1
We instantiate the building blocks TOS and rSIG of our first generic construction to obtain our first SPS scheme. We do so in the Type-I bilinear group setting. The resulting SIG1 scheme is an efficient structurepreserving signature scheme based only on the DLIN assumption.
Setup for Type-I groups
The following setup procedure is common for all instantiations in this section. The global parameter gk is given to all functions implicitly.
Output gk := (Λ, G, C, F, U ).
The parameter gk fixes the message space
for the RMAsecure signature scheme presented in Section 5.3. For our generic framework to work, the tagged one-time signature schemes should have the same tag space.
Tagged one-time signature scheme
Our scheme generates tags consisting of only one group element, C t , which is optimally efficient in its size. However, as mentioned above, we need to adjust the tag space to match the message space of rSIG. We thus describe the scheme with a tag in the extended form of (C t , F t , U t ). The extended elements F t and U t can be dropped when unnecessary as it is done in its direct application shown in Section ??.
Our concrete construction of TOS can be seen as an adaptation of a one-time signature scheme in [8] so that it enjoys optimally short one-time public-key (i.e., a tag) with no corresponding one-time secret-key. We note that, given TOS, one can construct a one-time signature scheme. But the reverse is not known in general. 
TOS.Vrf(pk , tag, msg, σ): Parse σ as (Z, R, S) ∈ G 3 , msg as (M 1 , . . . , M k ) ∈ G k , and tag as (T, T , T ). Return 1 if the following equations hold. Return 0, otherwise.
Correctness is verified by inspecting the following relations.
We state the following theorems, of which the first one is immediate from the construction.
Theorem 5. The above TOS is structure-preserving, and yields uniform tags and constant-size signatures. 
is the size of the groups produced by G. Moreover, the run-time overhead of the reduction B is a small number of multi-exponentiations per signing or tag query.
Proof. Given successful forger A against TOS as a black-box, we construct B that breaks SDP as follows. 
On receiving signing query msg j = (M 1 , . . . , M k ), algorithm B takes ζ and ρ used for computing tag j (if tag j is not yet defined, execute the above procedure for generating tag j and take new ζ and ρ) and computes
Then B returns σ j := (Z, R, S) to A and records (tag j , σ j , msg j ).
When A outputs a forgery (tag † , σ † , msg † ), algorithm B searches the records for (tag, σ, msg) such that tag † = tag and (msg † , σ † ) = (msg, σ). If no such entry exists, B aborts. Otherwise, B computes
and their dagger counterparts are taken from (σ, msg) and (σ † , msg † ), respectively. B finally outputs (Z , R , S ) and stops. This completes the description of B.
We claim that B solves the problem by itself or the view of A is perfectly simulated. The correctness of key generation has been already inspected. In the simulation of O t , there is a case of T = 1 that happens with probability 1/p. If it happens, B outputs a correct answer to I sdp , which is clear by
Otherwise, tag T is uniformly distributed over G * and the simulation is perfect.
Oracle O s is simulated perfectly as well. Correctness of simulated σ j = (Z, R, S) can be verified by inspecting the following relations.
Every Z is uniformly distributed over G due to the uniform choice of ζ. Then R and S are uniquely determined by following the distribution of Z. Accordingly, A outputs a successful forgery with non-negligible probability and B finds a corresponding record (tag, σ, msg). We show that output (Z , R , S ) from B is a valid solution to I sdp . First, equation (2) is satisfied because
holds. Equation (3) can be verified similarly. It remains to prove that Z = 1. Note that, if msg = msg † but this is still a valid forgery then it must be the case that (Z, R) = (Z † , R † ). Since R (resp. R † ) is uniquely determined by Z and msg (resp. Z † , msg † ), that would mean that Z = 1. Alternatively, if msg † = msg, then there exists ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that M † /M = 1. We claim that parameters χ 1 , . . . , χ k are independent of the view of A. We prove it by showing that, for every possible assignment to χ 1 , . . . , χ k , there exists an assignment to other coins, i.e., (γ 1 , . . . , γ k , δ 1 , . . . , δ k ) and (ζ (1) , ρ (1) , . . . , ζ (qs) , ρ (qs) ) for q s queries, that is consistent with the view of A. (By ζ (j) , we denote ζ with respect to the j-th query. We follow this convention hereafter. Without loss of generality, we assume that A makes q s tag queries and the same number of signing queries.) Observe that the view of A consists of independent group elements (G,
k ) for j = 1, . . . , q s . (Note that we omit R (j) and S (j) from the view since they are uniquely determined by the other components.) We represent the view by the discrete-logarithms of these group elements with respect to base G. Namely, the view is represented by (1, w z , w r , µ z , µ s , τ, w 1 , µ 1 , . . . , w k , µ k ) and (t (j) , z (j) , m 
τ t (j) = w z ζ (j) + w r ρ (j) , and
For any ∈ {1, . . . , k}, fix χ 1 , . . . , χ −1 , χ +1 , . . . , χ k , and consider χ . For every value of χ in Z p , the linear equations in (6) determine γ and δ . Then, if m (j) = 0, equation (8) determines ζ (j) , and ρ (j) follows from equation (7). If m (j) = 0, then ζ (j) , ρ (j) can be assigned independently from χ . The above holds for every in {1, . . . , k}. Thus, if (χ 1 , . . . , χ k ) is distributed uniformly over Z k p , then other coins are distributed uniformly as well and the view of A is still consistent. Remark 1. The above TOS does not trivially work in the Type-III setting since computing R from T in signing, simulating T using G r in the reduction, and computing pairing e(G r , R) in the verification cannot be consistent. In a very recent paper [7] , however, it is claimed that it can work if some extra group elements are given in public-keys and the underlying assumption. But details are not published yet.
Now we see that given
Remark 2. The TOS can be used to sign messages of unbounded length by chaining the signatures. Every message block except for the last one is followed by a tag used to sign the next block. The signature consists of all internal signatures and tags. The initial tag is considered as the tag for the entire signature. For a message consisting of m group elements, it repeats τ := 1 + max(0, m−k k−1 ) times and the resulting signature consists of 4τ − 1 elements.
RMA-secure signature scheme
To sign random group elements we will use a construction based on the dual system signature scheme of Waters [51] . For readers unfamiliar with Waters' scheme we recall it in Appendix A. Our intuition for making the original scheme structure-preserving is as follows. While the original scheme is CMA-secure under the DLIN assumption, the security proof makes use of a trapdoor commitment to elements in Z p and consequently messages are elements in Z p rather than G. Our construction below resorts to RMA-security and removes this commitment to allow messages to be a sequence of random group elements satisfying a particular relation. Concretely, the message space M
Moreover, the tag elements of Waters' scheme are removed in our RMA-secure scheme as they were primarily required for (adaptive) CMA-security.
Other minor modifications are needed for the structure-preserving property. We modify the verification algorithm. Our verification algorithm is deterministic and uses five verification equations. Two equations are for signature elements that are not related to the message part-this is a consequence of deterministic verification. Three equations are for the (extended) message part. We also slightly modify the verification key. One element in G T is divided into two elements of G via randomization due to the requirement of SPS.
[Scheme rSIG] rSIG.Key(gk): Given gk := (Λ, G, C, F, U ) as input, uniformly select V, V 1 , V 2 , H from G * and a 1 , a 2 , b, α, and ρ from Z * p . Then compute and output vk :
rSIG.Sign(sk, msg): Parse msg into (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ). Pick random r 1 , r 2 , z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z p . Let r = r 1 + r 2 . Compute and output signature σ := (S 0 , S 1 , . . . S 7 ) where
. Also parse vk accordingly. Verify the following pairing product equations:
e(S 1 , B) e(S 4 , B 2 ) e(S 5 , A 2 ) = e(S 6 , R 2 ) e(S 7 , W 2 ) e(X 1 , X 2 ),
e(U, M 1 ) = e(C, M 3 ).
The scheme is structure-preserving by construction and the correctness is easily verified as follows.
(Left-hand of (9)
Equation (9) and (10) hold since r = r 1 + r 2 . The followings also hold.
(Left-hand of (11)) = e(G r1 , U m H) = e(G, U m H) r1 = e(G, (U m H) r1 ) = (Right-hand of (11)), (Left-hand of (12)) = e(F, C m ) = e(F, C) m = e(C, F m ) = (Right-hand of (12)), (Left-hand of (13)) = e(U, C m ) = e(U, C) m = e(C, U m ) = (Right-hand of (13)). Proof. We refer to the signatures output by the signing algorithm as normal signatures. In the proof we will consider an additional type of signatures which we refer to as simulation-type signatures; these will be computationally indistinguishable but easier to simulate. For γ ∈ Z p , simulation-type signatures are of the form σ = (S 0 , S 1 = S 1 · G −a1a2γ , S 2 = S 2 · G a2γ , S 3 , S 4 = S 4 · G a1γ , S 5 , . . . , S 7 ) where (S 0 , . . . , S 7 ) is a normal signature. We give the outline of the proof using some lemmas. Proofs for the lemmas are given after the outline.
Lemma 3. Any signature that is accepted by the verification algorithm must be either a normal signature or a simulation-type signature.
To prove this lemma, we introduced two verification equations for signature elements that are not related to a message. We consider a sequence of games. Let p i be the probability that the adversary succeeds in We have shown that in Game q, A can output a normal-type forgery with at most negligible probability. Thus, by Lemma 5 we can conclude that the same is true in Game 0 and it holds that
Proof. (of Lemma 3)
We have to show that only normal and simulation-type signatures can fulfil these equations. We ignore verification equations (12) and (13) that establish that msg is well-formed. A signature has 4 random exponents, r 1 , r 2 , z 1 , z 2 . A simulation-type signature has additional exponent γ. We interpret S 7 as G r1 , and it follows from verification equation (11) that S 0 is (M 3 H) r1 . We interpret S 3 as G −bz1 , S 5 as G −bz2 , and S 6 as G r2b . Now we have fixed all exponents of a normal signature. The remaining two verification equations tell us that
We interpret S 1 as G α·a1 V r G −a1a2γ . Now we have two equations and two unknowns that fix S 2 to G −α V r 1 G z1 G a2γ and S 4 to V r 2 G z2 G a1γ respectively. If γ = 0 we have a normal signature, otherwise we have a simulation-type signature.
Proof. (of Lemma 4).
Suppose for contradiction that there is an adversary A, which, when playing Game 0 (and thus receiving only normal signatures), produces forgeries which are formed like simulation-type signatures. Then we can construct an adversary B 1 for DLIN as follows.
Let I dlin = (Λ, G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , X, Y, Z) be an instance of DLIN where Λ = (p, G, G T , e) is a Type-I bilinear group setting and G 1 , G 2 , G 3 are randomly taken from G * and there exist random x, y, z ∈ Z p such that X = G x 1 , Y = G y 2 and Z = G z 3 or G x+y
3
. Given I dlin , adversary B 1 works as follows. It first sets G := G 3 and chooses C, F, U at random from G * , and then sets them into gk. Next, it chooses v, v 1 , v 2 ∈ Z * p and computes V := G v 3 , V 1 := G v1 3 , and V 2 := G v2 3 . (This way we know the discrete log of these values w.r.t. G 3 .) Then it chooses random H ∈ G * , b, α, ρ ∈ Z * p and compute:
and sets them into vk and sk, accordingly. Note that both the distribution of the public and secret keys are statistically close to that in the real DLIN game. Moreover, to sign random messages, B 1 can follow the real signing algorithm by using sk.
Suppose that A produces a valid forgery σ † and msg † . Then B 1 proceeds as follows. It parses σ † as (S 0 , . . . , S 7 ). By Lemma 3, it is shown that if the verification equations hold, then it must hold that
If this is a simulation-type signature, it holds that γ = 0. According to our choice of public-key, we can rewrite 
3 , and S 7 = G r1 3 , and it has b, α and the discrete logarithms of V, V 1 , V 2 w.r.t. G 3 . Thus, it will be straightforward to extract the above values.
Proof. (of Lemma 5). Suppose for contradiction that there exists an adversary A such that the probabilities that A outputs a normal-type forgery in Game i and Game i + 1 differ by a non-negligible amount. Then we will use A to construct an algorithm B 2 that breaks the DLIN assumption. B 2 is given an instance of DLIN; I dlin = (Λ, G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , X, Y, Z). Note that determining whether a signature is of normal-type or simulation-type naturally corresponds to a DLIN problem: each signature contains S 7 = G r1 , S 6 = (G b ) r2 , and S 1 which will include V r1+r2 or V r1+r2 G −a1a2γ depending on whether this is a normal-or simulation-type signature. (Recall that we define r = r 1 + r 2 .) If B 2 sets G = G 2 , G b = G 1 , and V = G 3 , then it seems fairly straightforward to argue based on the DLIN assumption that it will be impossible for the adversary to distinguish normal and simulation-type signatures. However, B 2 cannot tell whether A's forgery is normal-or simulation-type in this simulation. Thus, there will be no way for B 2 to take advantage of a change in A's success probability to solve the DLIN challenge.
The solution is to set things up so that, with high probability B 2 can take S 0 from the adversary's forgery and extract something that looks like G r1 3 (which will allow B 2 to distinguish DLIN tuples and consequently detect simulation-type signatures), but at the same time it is guaranteed that for the i-th message, the G 3 component of S 0 will cancel out, leaving only an G r1 2 component which will not allow the challenger itself to know whether a simulated signature is normal-type or simulation-type.
More specifically, the idea will be to choose some secret values ξ, β, χ, η and embed them in the parameters so that for message
. If ξw + β = 0, this gives useful information on G r1 3 (in particular it will allow B 2 to test candidate values), while if ξw + β = 0, this has no G 3 component and thus doesn't help at all with finding G r1 3 . B 2 chooses ξ, β so that ξw + β = 0 for the w used to generate the ith message. Furthermore, it will be guaranteed that ξ, β are information theoretically hidden even given w, so the adversary has only negligible chance of producing another message with U w * such that ξw * + β = 0 as well. Now we show details of the algorithm for B 2 . First of all, B 2 sets up the message space and generates the public-key in the following manner. B 2 sets (C, F ), used to define message space M, to (G ϕ 1 , G 3 ) by choosing random ϕ ← Z * p . It chooses random ξ, β, χ, η ← Z * p , and computes U := G χ 2 G ξ 3 , and H := G η 2 G β 3 . These values will be uniformly distributed, and independent of ξ, β. B 2 then sets
B 2 also sets B := G 1 , and chooses V, V 1 , V 2 . It must choose these values carefully so that it can compute both R i and R b i , and at the same time so that the component V r of a signature-value S 1 gives B 2 some useful information (in particular it will allow B 2 to derive G r 3 ). It does this by choosing v 1 , v 2 , δ ← Z * p , and computing V := G −a1a2δ
and sets them into vk and sk, accordingly. Note that both of these tuples are distributed statistically close to those produced by Setup and rSIG.Key. Next B 2 simulates signatures for the j-th random message as follows.
Case j < i: It chooses w j at random and computes (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) = (C wj , F wj , U wj ). It can compute a simulation-type signatures for this message since it has sk and G a1a2 = G a1a2 2 .
Case j = i: It chooses w such that ξw + β = 0 and computes (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) = (C w , F w , U w ). Note that since no information about ξ, β is revealed this message will look appropriately random to the adversary. It will implicitly hold that r 1 = y and r 2 = x. B 2 computes S 6 = G br2 = G x 1 = X and
What remains is to compute S 1 , S 2 , S 4 . Note that this involves computing V r , V r 1 , and V r 2 respectively. This is where B 2 will embed its challenge. Recall that V = G −a1a2δ 3 . Thus, it will compute V r = (G r1+r2 3 ) −a1a2δ as Z −a1a2δ . If Z = G x+y 3 this will be correct; if Z = G z 3 for random z, then there will be an extra factor of G −a1a2δ(z−(x+y)) 3
(which is uniformly random from the adversary's point of view), then this is distributed exactly as it should be in a simulation-type signature. Thus, 
, then this will be
where the second to last equality follows from our choice of γ above. By a similar argument, B 2 computes S 4 as Y v2 Z a1δ G s2 2 and this will be either V r 
By Lemma 3, we are guaranteed that if the signature S verifies, then there must exist w, r 1 , r 2 , γ such that S 0 = (U w H) r1 , S 1 = G αa1 V r G −a1a2γ , S 6 = G br2 , and S 7 = G r1 where r = r 1 + r 2 . We are also guaranteed that M 1 = (G ϕ 1 ) w and M 2 = G w 3 . Rephrased in terms of our parameters, this means
Plugging this into the above computation we get that B 2 will output 1 if and only if
Simplifying the left side to
and the right side to
and by dividing out all the pairings of the left side we obtain the simplified equation
which is true if and only if either ξw + β = 0 or γ = 0. Since ξw i + β is a pairwise-independent function, we are guaranteed that ξw + β = 0 happens with negligible probability. Thus, we conclude that B 2 outputs 1 iff γ = 0 and this was a normal-type signature, and B 2 outputs 0 iff γ = 0 and this was a simulation-type signature.
Proof. (of Lemma 6). Suppose that there exists an adversary A that outputs normal-type forgeries with non-negligible probability in Game q. Then we construct an adversary B 3 for the CDH problem as follows. B 3 is given X = G x , Y = G y and must compute G xy . B 3 will proceed as follows.
Message space setup and key generation: B 3 will implicitly set α := xy and a 2 := y. It chooses b, a 1 at random from Z * p . B 3 needs to be able to compute V a2 2 , so it chooses random v 2 ∈ Z * p and sets V 2 := G v2 . It also wants to have the discrete logarithm of V 1 , so it will choose random v 1 ∈ Z * p and set V 1 := G v1 . B 3 chooses U, C, F ∈ G and H, V ∈ G * at random, sets G a2 := Y , and computes V V a2 2 = V Y v2 . It chooses random ρ ∈ Z * p and sets X 1 := X ρ and X 2 := Y a1b/ρ . The rest of the parameters can be constructed honestly.
Signature queries: On a signature query, B 3 chooses w at random, computes
and generates a simulation-type signature as follows. It chooses random r 1 , r 2 , z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z p , and random s ∈ Z p and implicitly sets γ := (x − s). B 3 computes
The rest of the signature can be computed honestly.
Adversary's forgery: When the adversary outputs a normal-type forgery, there exists r 1 , r 2 , z 1 such that
B 3 will output this value. By our choice of parameters, recall that α = xy, so it holds that G α = G xy as desired.
That is, B 3 can solve the CDH problem.
Let MSGGen be an extended random message generator that first chooses ω = m randomly from Z p and then computes msg = (C m , F m , U m ). Note that this is what the reduction algorithm does in the proof of Theorem 7. Therefore, the same reduction algorithm works for the case of extended random message attacks with respect to message generator MSGGen. We thus have the following. 
Security and efficiency of resulting SIG1
Let SIG1 be the signature scheme obtained from TOS and rSIG by following the first generic construction in Section 4. From Theorems 1, 2, 6, and 7, the following is immediate. The efficiency is summarized in Table 1 . It is compared to an existing efficient structure-preserving scheme in [4, Section 5.2] . (The original scheme is presented over asymmetric bilinear groups. It is translated to the symmetric setting for our purpose.) We measure the efficiency by counting the number of group elements and the number of pairing product equations for verifying a signature. In Table 2 , we also assess the cost of proving possession of valid signatures and messages by using Groth-Sahai NIWI and NIZK proof system. Columns "σ" indicate the case where a witness is a valid signature. (Regarding the signature scheme from [4] , we optimize by putting randomizable parts of a signature in the clear.) The message is put in the clear. Similarly, columns "(σ, msg)" show the case where a witness consists of a valid signature and a message. Details of each assessment are as follows.
For NIWI, the cost of proving valid σ is counted by
and the cost of proving valid (σ, msg) is counted by
where |π L/N L |, |σ rnd |, |σ wit |, |com| are the size of a proof for a linear/non-linear relation, randomizable parts of a signature, rest of the parts in the signature, and commitment per witness, respectively. Also, LPPE and NLPPE denotes the linear and non-linear PPEs in the verification predicate of the signature scheme. For NIZK, we need to turn either of input constants in every constant pairing into a witness, and prove that it is committed correctly. Those proof of correct commitment of public constants are done by proving a relation in multiscalar multiplication equations, whose size is denoted by |π M S |. Let #(CONST) denote the number of constant pairings in the verification PPE. The costs for ZK are estimated by
. (17) According to [37] , we have (|com|, |π L |, |π N L |) = (3, 3, 9) in G, and |π M S | = 3 in Z p . Proof π M S can consist of elements in G by describing the relation of correct commitment of public value with a pairing product equation. It turns entire proof to be structure-preserving with increased proof size. For [4] , we have |σ wit | = 3, |σ rnd | = 4. Since the verification consists of 2 non-linear equations, we have #(NLPPE) = 0 and #(LPPE) = 2. This results in |NIWI(σ)| = 3 · 3 + 4 + 9 · 0 + 3 · 2 = 19 and |NIWI(σ, msg)| = 3·(3+k)+4+9·0+3·2 = 3k+19. For NIZK(σ), we have #(CONST) = 6+k constant pairings in the signature verification. (In detail, k comes from the pairings that involve the message, 4 is from the parings that only involves public-key, and 2 is from the pairings that involves the randomizable part of the signature.) Thus 3 · (6 + k) group elements and Zp elements are needed on top of NIWI(σ). For NIZK(σ, msg), on the other hand, the message is hidden as a witness. Thus we can set #(CONST) = 6 and the additional cost on NIWI(σ, msg) is 3 · 6 group elements and Z p elements.
Regarding to SIG1, whole signature is considered as a witness. Thus we have |σ wit | = 14 and |σ rnd | = 0. And the verification consists of 6 linear equations and 1 non-linear equation; #(NLPPE) = 1 and #(LPPE) = 6. We thus have |NIWI(σ)| = 3·14+0+9·1+3·6 = 69 and |NIWI(σ, msg)| = 3·(14+k)+0+9·1+3·6 = 3k + 69. For NIZK(σ), we have #(CONST) = 1 + k constant pairings in the signature verification, which results in adding 3 + 3k elements in both G and Z p to NIWI(σ). Finally, for NIZK(σ, msg), we have #(CONST) = 1, which adds 3 elements in G and Z p to NIWI(σ, msg). 
Instantiating SIG2
We instantiate the POS and xSIG building blocks of our second generic construction to obtain our second SPS scheme. Here we choose the Type-III bilinear group setting. The resulting SIG2 scheme is an efficient structure-preserving signature scheme based on SXDH and XDLIN.
Setup for Type-III groups
The following setup procedure is common for all building blocks in this section. The global parameter gk is given to all functions implicitly.
• Setup(1 λ ): Run Λ = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e) ← G(1 λ ) and choose generators G ∈ G * 1 andĜ ∈ G * 2 . Also choose u, f 1 , f 2 randomly from Z * p , compute F 1 := G f1 ,F 1 :=Ĝ f1 , F 2 := G f2 ,F 2 :=Ĝ f2 , U := G u ,Û :=Ĝ u , and output gk := (Λ, G,Ĝ, F 1 ,F 1 , F 2 ,F 2 , U,Û ).
A gk defines a message space M x = {(F m 1 ,F m 2 ,Û m ) ∈ (G * 2 ) 3 | m ∈ Z p } for the XRMA-secure signature scheme in this section. For our generic construction to work, the partial one-time signature scheme must have the same key space.
Partial one-time signatures for unilateral messages
We first construct a partial one-time signature scheme, POSu2, for messages in G k 2 for k > 0. The suffix "u2" indicates that the scheme is unilateral and messages are taken from G 2 . Correspondingly, POSu1 refers to the scheme whose messages belong to G 1 , which is obtained by swapping G 2 and G 1 in the following description. In the following section we will show how to combine POSu2 and POSu1 to obtain signatures on bilateral messages consisting of elements from both G 1 and G 2 .
Our POSu2 scheme is a minor refinement of the one-time signature scheme introduced in [8] . It comes, however, with a security proof for the new security model. Basically, a one-time public-key in our scheme consists of one element in the source group G 1 , the opposite group from the one to which the messages belong. This property is very useful when we move on to construct a POS scheme for signing bilateral messages.
Like the tags in the TOS of Section 5.2, the one-time public-keys of POSu2 will have to be in an extended form, (F a 1 , F a 2 , U a ), to meet the constraint from xSIG presented in the sequel. The extended part (F a 1 , F a 2 ) can be dropped if unnecessary.
[Scheme POSu2] POSu2.Key(gk ): Take generators U andÛ from gk . Choose w r uniformly from Z * p and compute G r := U wr . For i = 1, . . . , k, uniformly choose χ i and γ i from Z p and compute G i := U χi G γi r . Output pk := (G r , G 1 , ..., G k ) ∈ G k+1 1 and sk := (χ 1 , γ 1 , ..., χ k , γ k , w r ).
POSu2.Update(gk): Take F 1 , F 2 , U from gk . Choose a ← Z p and output opk := (F a 1 , F a 2 , U a ) ∈ G 3 1 and osk := a.
POSu2.Sign(sk , msg, osk ): Parse msg into (M 1 , . . . ,M k ) ∈ G k 2 . Take a and w r from osk and sk , respectively. Choose ρ randomly from Z p and compute ζ := a − ρ w r mod p. Then compute and output σ := (Z,R) ∈ G 2 2 as the signature, wherẽ
POSu2.Vrf(pk , opk , msg, σ): Parse σ as (Z,R) ∈ G 2 2 , msg as (M 1 , . . . ,M k ) ∈ G k 2 , and opk as (A 1 , A 2 , A).
holds. Return 0, otherwise. ¶ Scheme POSu2 is structure-preserving and has uniform one-time public-keys by construction. It is correct as the following relation holds for the verification equation and the computed signatures: 
Partial one-time signatures for bilateral messages
Using POSu1 for msg ∈ G k1+1 1 and POSu2 for msg ∈ G k2 2 , we construct a POSb scheme for signing bilateral messages (msg 1 ,
The scheme is a simple two-story construction where msg 2 is signed by POSu2 with one-time secret-key osk 2 ∈ G 1 and then the one-time public-key opk 2 is attached to msg 1 and signed by POSu1. Public-key opk 2 is included in the signature, and opk 1 is output as a one-time public-key for POSb.
[Scheme POSb]
POSb.Key(gk ): Run (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ← POSu1.Key(gk ) for message size k 1 +1 and (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← POSu2.Key(gk ) for message size k 2 . Set pk := (pk 1 , pk 2 ) and sk := (sk 1 , sk 2 ), and output (pk , sk ).
POSb.Update(gk): Run (opk , osk ) ← POSu1.Update(gk) and output (opk , osk ).
POSb.Sign(sk , msg, osk ): Parse msg into (msg 1 , msg 2 ) ∈ G k1 1 × G k2 2 , and sk into (sk 1 , sk 2 ). Run (opk 2 , osk 2 ) ← POSu2.Update(gk), and compute σ 2 ← POSu2.Sign(sk 2 , msg 2 , osk 2 ) and σ 1 ← POSu1.Sign(sk 1 , (msg 1 , opk 2 ), osk ). Output σ := (σ 1 , σ 2 , opk 2 ).
POSb.Vrf(pk , opk , msg, σ): Parse msg into (msg 1 , msg 2 ) ∈ G k1 1 ×G k2 2 , and σ into (σ 1 , σ 2 , opk 2 ). If 1 = POSu1.Vrf(pk 1 , opk , (msg 1 , opk 2 ), σ 1 ) = POSu2.Vrf(pk 2 , opk 2 , msg 2 , σ 2 ), output 1. Otherwise, output 0. ¶ We consider dropping unnecessary extended part from opk 2 so that it consists of only one group element. Then, for a message in G k1 1 × G k2 2 , the above POSb uses a public-key of size (k 2 + 1, k 1 + 2), yields a one-time public-key of size (0, 3), and a signature of size (3, 2) . Verification requires 2 pairing product equations. A one-time public-key, which is treated as a message to xSIG in this section, is of the form opk = (F a 1 ,F a 2 ,Û a ) ∈ G 3 2 . The structure-preservation and uniform public-key properties carry over from the underlying POSu1 and POSu2. Proof. Suppose an adversary A outputs a forgery (opk † , σ † , msg † ). Then there exists a triple (σ, opk , msg) observed by the signing oracle such that opk † = opk and (msg † , σ † ) = (msg, σ).
. Similarly, let msg = (msg 1 , msg 2 ) and σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , opk 2 ). Then there are two cases; either ((msg 1 , opk 2 ), σ 1 ) = ((msg † 1 , opk † 2 ), σ † 1 ), or opk 2 = opk † 2 and (msg 2 , σ 2 ) = (msg † 2 , σ † 2 ). In the first case we break the strong unforgeability of POSu1 and contradict the DBP 2 assumption; in the second case we break the strong unforgeability of POSu2 and contradict the DBP 1 assumption. Accordingly, we have Adv ot-cma POSb,A (λ) ≤ Adv dbp1 G,A (λ) + 1/p + Adv dbp2 G,B (λ) + 1/p ≤ Adv sxdh G,B (λ) + 2/p.
XRMA-secure signature scheme
Our construction is based on a variant of Waters' dual system encryption proposed by Ramanna, Chatterjee, and Sarkar [44] . An intuition behind our XRMA-secure scheme is the same as that of RMA-secure scheme in the previous section. Recall that gk = (Λ, G,Ĝ, F 1 ,F 1 , F 2 ,F 2 , U,Û ) with Λ = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e) is generated by Setup(1 λ ) in advance (see Section 6.1).
[Scheme xSIG] xSIG.Gen(gk): Given gk as input, uniformly select generators V, V ← G * 1 ,V ,V ∈ G * 2 such that V ∼V , V ∼V ,H ← G * 2 , and exponents a, b, α, ρ ← Z * p . Then compute and output vk := (gk,B,Ã,B a ,R,W ,H, X 1 ,X 2 ) and sk := (vk,
. Pick random r 1 , r 2 , z ← Z p . Let r := r 1 + r 2 . Compute and output signature σ := (S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S 5 ) wherẽ
xSIG.Vrfy(vk, msg, σ): Parse msg into (M 1 ,M 2 ,M 3 ) and σ into (S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S 5 ). Also parse vk accordingly. Verify the following pairing product equations:
e(F 2 ,M 3 ) = e(U,M 2 ).
The scheme is structure-preserving by construction. We can easily verify the correctness as follows.
(Left-hand of (23)) = e(G α V r ,Ĝ b )e((V ) r G −z ,Ĝ ba )e(G bz ,Ĝ a ) = e(G,Ĝ) αb e(V,Ĝ) br e(V ,Ĝ) abr
Equation (23) holds since r = r 1 + r 2 , V ∼V , and V ∼V . The followings also hold.
(Left-hand of (24)) = e(G r1 ,Û mH ) = e(G,Û mH ) r1 = e(G, (Û mH ) r1 ) = (Right-hand of (24)),
(Left-hand of (25)) = e(F 1 ,Û m ) = e(F 1 ,Û ) m = e(U,F m 1 ) = (Right-hand of (25)),
(Left-hand of (26)) = e(F 2 ,Û m ) = e(F 2 ,Û ) m = e(U,F m 2 ) = (Right-hand of (26)).
Theorem 11. The above xSIG scheme is UF-XRMA with respect to the message generator that returns ω = m for every random message msg = (F m 1 ,F m 2 ,Û m ) under the DDH 2 and XDLIN 1 assumptions. In particular for any p.p.t. algorithm A for xSIG making at most q(λ) signing queries, there exist p.p.t. algorithms B 1 , B such that Adv uf-xrma xSIG,A (λ) ≤ Adv ddh2 G,B1 (λ) + (q(λ) + 1)Adv xdlin1 G,B (λ).
Proof. In this scheme, simulation-type signatures are of the form σ = (S 0 , S 1 = S 1 · G −aγ , S 2 = S 2 · G γ , S 3 , S 4 , S 5 ) for γ ∈ Z p . The outline of the proof follows that of Water's dual signature scheme and is quite similar to the proof of Theorem 7. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Any signature that is accepted by the verification algorithm must be either a normal-type signature or a simulation-type signature.
Proof. (of Lemma 7) We ignore the last row of verification equations that establish that msg is well-formed. A signature has 3 random exponents, r 1 , r 2 , z. A simulation-type signature has an additional exponent γ.
We interpret S 5 as G r1 , so the first verification equation
then a remaining unknown value is S 2 . The verification equation is
Based on the notion of simulation-type signatures, we consider a sequence of games. Let p i be the probability that the adversary succeeds in Game i, and p norm i (λ) and p sim i (λ) be the probability that he succeeds with a normal-type or simulation-type forgery respectively. Then by Lemma 7, p We have shown that in Game q, A can output a normal-type forgery with at most negligible probability. Thus, by Lemma 9 we can conclude that the same is true in Game 0. Since we have already shown that in Game 0 the adversary can output simulation-type forgeries only with negligible probability, and that any signature that is accepted by the verification algorithm is either normal or simulation-type, we conclude that the adversary can produce valid forgeries with only negligible probability
as stated. The last inequality holds since the CDH 1 assumption is implied by the XDLIN 1 assumption.
Proof. (of Lemma 8) We show that, if the adversary outputs a simulation-type forgery, then we can construct algorithm B 1 that solves the DDH 2 problem. Algorithm B 1 is given instance (Λ,Ĝ,Ĝ s ,Ĝ a ,Z ∈ G 2 ) of DDH 2 , and simulates the verification key and the signing oracle for the signature scheme. (B 1 does not have the values a, s.) B 1 generates gk and vk as follows. It selects G ← G 1 , and exponents u, f 1 , f 2 ← Z * p , computes F 1 := G f1 ,F 1 :=Ĝ f1 , F 2 := G f2 ,F 2 :=Ĝ f2 , U := G u ,Û :=Ĝ u , and sets them into gk. It also selects
and sets them into vk and sk, accordingly. B 1 can generate normal-type signatures by using the (normal) signing algorithm since B 1 has α, b and V, V . For i-th signature, B 1 randomly selects m i ∈ Z p , generates normal-type signature σ i for message (F mi 1 ,F mi 2 ,Û mi ), and gives ((F mi 1 ,F mi 2 ,Û mi ), σ i , m i ) to A. If adversary A outputs a simulation-type forgery
, and S 0 := (M 3H ) r1 , for some r 1 , r 2 , z, γ ∈ Z p (r = r 1 + r 2 ) for message msg = (F m 1 ,F m 2 ,Û m ), then B 1 can compute (G aγ , G γ ) from S 1 , S 2 respectively. The reason is as follows: or not because e(G aγ ,Ĝ s ) = e(G,Ĝ) asγ = e(G γ ,Ĝ as ). IfẐ =Ĝ as (DDH tuple), then the equation holds. Thus, B 1 solves the DDH 2 problem whenever the adversary outputs a valid simulation-type forgery, i.e., p sim 0 (λ) ≤ Adv ddh2 G,B1 (λ) as claimed.
and the right hand side is
A simplified equation is 1 = e(G 2 ,Ĝ 1 ) γ * /δ(ξm * +β) . Thus, the difference of A's advantage in two games gives the advantage of B 2 in solving the XDLIN 1 problem as stated.
Proof. (of Lemma 10) Observe that, in p norm q (λ), A is given simulation-type signatures only. We show that if A outputs a normal-type forgery in p norm q (λ) then we can construct algorithm B 3 that solves the co-CDH problem. B 3 is given instance (Λ, G,Ĝ, G x , G y ,Ĝ x ,Ĝ y ) of the co-CDH problem. B 3 generates the verification key as follows: B 3 selects exponents u, h, f 1 , f 2 ← Z * p , computes F 1 := G f1 ,F 1 :=Ĝ f1 , F 2 := G f2 , F 2 :=Ĝ f2 , U := G u ,Û :=Ĝ u , and sets them into gk.
and sets them into vk and sk, accordingly. Note that it means implicitly ρ = ρ x and α = xy though B 3 does not have α, ρ. Therefore B 3 does not have K 1 = G α = G xy , and cannot compute normal-type signatures. For i-th message, B 3 randomly select m i ∈ Z p and outputs simulation-type signatures for each random message msg i = (F mi 1 ,F mi 2 ,Û mi ) as follows: B 3 selects r 1 , r 2 , z, γ ← Z p , sets r := r 1 + r 2 (we want to set γ := x + γ ), and computes:
That is, B 3 can solve the co-CDH problem and it holds that p norm q (λ) ≤ Adv co-cdh G,B3 (λ) as claimed.
Remark 3. It is difficult to modify xSIG so as to rely on the DDH 1 and DDH 2 assumption, that is, only on the SXDH assumption because we are not given instances in group G 2 and cannot simulate verification keys in group G 2 under the DDH 1 assumption when we prove a similar statement to Lemma 9 by using DDH 1 . Constructing XRMA-secure SPS scheme only from the SXDH assumption is an important open problem since it will save on the number of group elements in a signature and a verification key. Moreover, it is non-trivial to modify xSIG so as to rely on the DDH 1 and XDLIN 1 because if we use assumptions only over G 1 , then all elements in a signature must be in G 1 . It means that a message must consist of elements in both G 1 and G 2 , which we would like to avoid.
Security and efficiency of resulting SIG2
Let SIG2 be the scheme obtained from POSb and xSIG. SIG2 is structure-preserving as vk, σ, and msg consist of group elements from G 1 and G 2 , and SIG2.Vrf evaluates pairing product equations. From Theorem 3, 10, and 11, we obtain the following theorem. Table 3 summarizes the efficiency of SIG2 for both unilateral messages consisting of k elements and bilateral messages consisting of k 1 and k 2 elements in G 1 and G 2 , respectively. We count the number of group elements in public components of SIG2. Note that the default generators in gk is not included in the count. For comparison, we also evaluate the efficiency of the schemes in [ Table 3 : Efficiency of SIG2 and comparison to other schemes with constant-size signatures. The upper half is for unilateral messages and the lower half is for bilateral messages. Notation (x, y) represents x elements in G 1 and y in G 2 .
[4] can sign a single group element, extended part of one-time verification key from POSb.Update can be dropped and gk need to include only one generator for each G 1 and G 2 .
In Table 4 and Table 5 , we assess the size of proofs for showing ones possession of a valid signature and message of SIG2 by using the GS-proof system as NIWI or NIZK. The general formulas are the same as those in (14) to (17) except that witnesses and linear equations in G 1 and G 2 are considered separately. (We say that an equation is linear in G 1 if all variables in the equation are in G 1 .) By (x, y), we denote x and y elements in G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Similarly, by (x, y, z), we denote additional element z in Z p . In this asymmetric setting, we have |com| = (2, 0, 0) for committing to G 1 elements, and |com| = (0, 2, 0) for G 2 . Proof size for linear equation in G 1 and G 2 is |π L | = (0, 2, 0) and (2, 0, 0), respectively. We also have |π N L | = (4, 4, 0) and |π M S | = (0, 0, 2).
We first consider the cases of NIWI shown in Table 4 . For unilateral messages, we have |σ wit | = (7, 4) group elements and |σ rnd | = (0, 0). Verifying POSu1 consists of one non-linear relation (19) , and verifying xSIG consists of one linear equation in G 1 (23), two linear equations in G 2 (25, 26) and one nonlinear equation (24) . Thus, |NIWI(σ)| = ((2, 0, 0) × 7 + (0, 2, 0) × 4) + 0 + (4, 4, 0) × 2 + ((0, 2, 0) × 1 + (2, 0, 0) × 2) = (26, 18, 0) . For bilateral messages, we have |σ wit | = (8, 6) group elements and |σ rnd | = (0, 0). Verifying POSb consists of verification for POSu1 and POSu2, which are two non-linear relations in total. (They are non-linear since one-time public-key A is in G 1 whereas signatureZ,R are in G 2 .) Equations for xSIG are the same as above. Thus |NIWI(σ)| = ((2, 0, 0) × 8 + (0, 2, 0) × 6) + 0 + (4, 4, 0) × 3 + ((0, 2, 0) × 1 + (2, 0, 0) × 2) = (32, 26, 0). For NIWI(σ, msg), we add (2k 1 , 0) and (2k 1 , 2k 2 ) elements for the commitment of the message in unilateral and bilateral case, respectively. Hence |NIWI(σ, msg)| = (2k 1 + 26, 18, 0) for unilateral case, and |NIWI(σ, msg)| = (2k 1 + 32, 2k 2 + 26, 0) for bilateral case.
We next consider the cases of NIZK. Additional elements comes from public constants to commit to, and the proof of their correct commitment. For NIZK(σ), every element in a message are regarded as public constants that are input to constant pairings. And xSIG involves one constant pairing e(X 1 ,X 2 ) where we commit to X 1 so that (23) remains a linear equation. We thus have k 1 + 1 constants to commit to in G 1 for the unilateral case, and k 1 + 1 and k 2 constants to commit to in G 1 and G 2 respectively in the bilateral case. By wrapping up, we have |NIZK(σ)| = |NIWI(σ)| + (2, 0, 0) × (k 1 + 1) + (0, 0, 2) × (k 1 + 1) = (2k 1 +28, 18, 2k 1 +2) for the unilateral case, and |NIZK(σ)| = |NIWI(σ)|+(2, 0, 0)×(k 1 +1)+(0, 2, 0)× k 2 + (0, 0, 2) × (k 1 + k 2 + 1) = (32, 26, 0) + (2k 1 + 2, 0, 0) + (0, 2k 2 , 0) + (0, 0, 2k 1 + 2k 2 + 2) = (2k 1 + 34, 2k 2 + 26, 2k 1 + 2k 2 + 2) for the bilateral case. For NIZK(σ, msg) where messages are already committed, additional elements are from committing to X 1 compared to the case of NIWI(σ, msg). We thus have |NIZK(σ, msg)| = |NIWI(σ, msg)| + (2, 0, 0) × 1 + (0, 0, 2) × 1 = (2k 1 + 28, 18, 2) for unilateral case, and |NIZK(σ, msg)| = |NIWI(σ, msg)| + (2, 0, 0) × 1 + (0, 0, 2) × 1 = (2k 1 + 34, 2k 2 + 26, 2) for bilateral case.
SIG2
|NIWI ( Table 5 : Costs for proving valid signature of SIG2 for unilateral and bilateral messages in ZK with the GS proof system.
Applications
We list a few recent examples of applications of SPS that benefit from our results.
• Group Signatures with Efficient Revocation and Compact Verifiable Shuffles. Using our SIG1 scheme from Section 5 both the construction of a group signature scheme with efficient revocation by Libert, Peters and Yung [41] and the construction of compact verifiable shuffles by Chase et al. [21] can be proven purely under the DLIN assumption. All other building blocks already have efficient instantiations based on DLIN.
• Tightly-secure Structure-preserving Signatures. Hofheinz and Jager [38] construct a tightly-secure one-time signature scheme and use it to construct s tightly-secure tree-based SPS scheme, say tSIG. Instead, we propose to use our partial one-time scheme to construct tSIG. As the resulting tSIG is secure against non-adaptive chosen message attacks, it is secure against extended random message attacks as well. We then combine the POSb scheme and the new tSIG scheme according to our second generic construction. The resulting signature scheme is significantly more efficient than [38] and is a SPS scheme with a tight security reduction to SXDH. As shown in [3] , the same is possible in Type-I groups by using the tagged one-time signature scheme in Section 5.2 whose security tightly reduced to DLIN.
• Simulation-sound and Simulation-extractable NIZK. In [3] , we also show how to construct more efficient simulation-sound and simulation-extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge (SS-NIZK & SE-NIZK) proof systems. While in [3] we were primarily interested in tightly-secure NIZK and thus used the tree-based tSIG scheme, RMA-security suffices for constructing unbounded SS-NIZK and SE-NIZK schemes. Our rSIG and xSIG schemes can thus be used directly to construct even more efficient unbounded SE-NIZK if one lifts the requirement of a tight reduction.
• Tightly-secure Structure-preserving CCA-secure Public-key Encryption. Following the approach of [38] and [3] , tightly-secure SE-NIZK enables tightly-secure and structure-preserving CCA-secure public-key encryption under standard decisional assumptions.
• Efficient Adaptive Oblivious Transfer. Hohenberger and Green proposed a universally composable (UC) adaptive oblivious transfer (AOT) protocol by using an SPS scheme based on a q-type assumption [34] . Thus their protocol relies on a q-type assumptions and constructing an efficient UC AOT protocol from only standard assumptions was an open problem. As a corollary of our result, we can obtain a UC AOT protocol based on only standard assumptions by replacing their SPS scheme with ours.
As an application of our schemes, Abe, Camenisch, Dubovitskaya, and Nishimaki proposed a UC AOT with hidden access control protocol from standard assumptions by using our schemes [1] . Moreover, they proposed an XRMA-secure SPS scheme only from the SXDH assumption based on another (non-structure-preserving) signature scheme by Chen, Lim, Ling, Wang, and Wee [22] . However, their scheme is less efficient than ours since their construction technique is different from ours and their message space is large.
Conclusions and Open Questions
We showed how to construct constant-size SPS consisting of only 11 to 14 group elements based on simple assumptions such as DLIN for symmetric pairings and analogues of DDH and XDLIN for asymmetric pairings. Our approach is modular and divides the problem into the need to construct constant-size RMA/xRMA secure SPS and constant-size structure-preserving one-time signatures. This is in line with the promise of [8] that SPS enable modular protocol design. Indeed this modularity facilitates applications in which one can cherry pick primitives according to requirements.
A tight bound for the size of SPS under simple assumptions is an important open question, and would shed light on the overhead of such a modular approach. It is also still an open question to construct efficient RMS/xRMA secure SPS schemes from only the SXDH assumption. Similarly, constructing (X)RMA-secure schemes with a message space that is a simple Cartesian product of groups without sacrificing efficiency and constructing more efficient RMA-secure schemes, which may not necessarily be XRMA-secure are interesting open problems. All RMA-secure signature schemes developed in this paper are in fact XRMA-secure.
